[Vol. 106

NOTES
REMAINDERS OVER IN DEFAULT OF EXERCISE OF
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND REVOCATION
WHERE THE REMAINDER WouLD BE VESTED ABSENT THE POWER

Assume a testator by his will gives the residue of his estate to his son

for life with power to appoint the remainder and, in default of appointment, to his grandson in fee. Absent the power, the gift to the grandson
would clearly be vested. Does the presence of the power make the remainder contingent? At common law, the consequences of this decision
were important. If the gift were held vested and the grandson predeceased
his father, his interest passed to his estate.1 The effect of exercise of the
power would be to divest the gift. If the gift were held contingent and the
grandson predeceased his father, the grandson's interest would fail.2 It
would be destroyed if the son conveyed his life interest and his reversion,
assuming the son was heir, to a third person. 3 Perhaps to avoid these
harsh results, courts have almost invariably held ;, gift in default of appointment to be vested, if it would have been vested absent the power.
4
Thus, the remainder has been held vested for purposes of survivorship,
5
for purposes of the rule destroying contingent remainders, to enable the
donee, with the remaindermen, to sell the property,6 and to defeat a claim
that the donee had a fee simple title.7 An identical result is required by
statutes in several American states, 8 and the Restatement of Property has
1. Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sr. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965 (Ch. 1748).
2. Lord Conway v. Walpole, Barnard. 153, 27 Eng. Rep. 593 (Ch. 1740).
3. E.g., Dunwoodie v. Reed, 3 S. & R. 434 (Pa. 1817); Festing v. Allen, 12 M. &
W. 279, 152 Eng. Rep. 1204 (Exch. 1843).
4. E.g., Parker v. MacBryde, 132 F2d 932 (4th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
779 (1943) ; Harvard College v. Balch, 171 Ill. 275, 49 N.E. 543 (1898); Wilson v.
Pichon, 162 Md. 199, 159 Atl. 766 (1932) ; Whipple v. Fairchild, 139 Mass. 262, 30
N.E. 89 (1885); Heron v. Stokes, 2 D. & W. 89 (Ch. 1842). See Matter of Bishop,
206 Misc. 7, 129 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Surr. Ct 1954), affd, 1 App. Div. 2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.
2d 310 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 294, 144 N.E.2d 63 (1957). The vesting of
the remainder seems to explain the cases giving a spouse of a nonsurviving remainderman a portion of the property passing by default to the remainderman's estate. See,
e.g., Follett v. Tyrer, 14 Sine. 125, 60 Eng. Rep. 305 (V.C. 1844).
5. Doe dem. Willis v. Martin, 4 T.R. 39, 100 Eng. Rep. 882 (K.B. 1790). Cf. Osbrey v. Bury, 1 Ball & B. 53 (Ch. 1808).
6. E.g., Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549, 10 Atl. 589 (1887); Lantz v. Massie,
99 Va. 709, 40 S.E. 50 (1901). Accord, Williman v. Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq. 475 (S.C.
1850) ; Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S.E. 436 (1894).
7. E.g., Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 167 Md. 158, 173 Atl.
31 (1934) ; Peabody v. Tyskiewicz, 191 Mass. 317, 77 N.E. 839 (1906). Cf. Cawker v.
Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 221 N.W. 401 (1928).
8. E.g., CAL. Civ. CoD ANN. § 781 (West 1954); IDA-o CoDS ANN. § 55.207
(1947); N.Y. RAL PRoPiMTY LAw § 41; So. DA. CoDn § 51.0422 (1939).
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adopted the same position. 9 The rule applies whether the gift over be of
real or personal property and whether the power be general or special.'0
To divest the remainder, the power must be effectually exercised," Only
2
one jurisdiction currently seems to regard the remainder as contingent.'
Where a settlor executes an inter vivos trust instrument reserving a
power to revoke, the interests of remaindermen would seem to be the same
as those of remaindermen who take in default of a power of appointment.
The textwriters have assumed that they were,13 and many courts, in sustaining inter vivos trusts, have indicated in dicta that such interests are
vested.' 4 However, of the three courts which have ruled on the issue, one
has held that the remainder is not vested. In Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Clemons,15 the settlor, during his life, created an inter vivos trust, reserving to himself a life estate and an unlimited power to revoke and change
beneficiaries. The remainder was left to his wife for her life and then to
his nieces and nephews. At the creation of the trust, there were fourteen
living nephews and nieces. At the settlor's death there were thirteen living
and at the death of the widow, seven. Three contentions were presented
as to the number of shares into which the remainder was divisible, each
contention depending on the time when the final remainder vested. It was
submitted that (1) the interests vested at the creation of the trust; (2) the
interests vested at the settlor's death because there was an implied condition precedent of surviving him; and (3) the interests vested only after
both the settlor and his wife died because there was an implied condition
should be
precedent of surviving both. The court held that the trust "...
9. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §

276 (1940).

10. Sandford v. Blake, 45 N.J. Eq. 247, 17 Atl. 812 (Ct. Err. & App. 1889) (dictum).
11. Commissioner v. Cardeza's Estate, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum). For
purposes of the 1951 Powers of Appointment Act, INT. Rsv. CoDS op 1954, § 2041,

however, the power need not be effectually exercised. Keating v. Mayer, 236 F.2d 478
(3d Cir. 1956).

12. In Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938), the
settlor executed an inter vivos trust agreement reserving to herself a life estate and a
power of appointment, and in default of appointment the property was to go to her
surviving children and the issue of deceased children. After deciding that the remainder
was not vested because of the requirement of survival, the court added, "Moreover, any
interest which the trustor's children or their issue might receive is further contingent
upon the trustor's not making a will and thereby excluding them from sharing in the
property." Id. at 228, 196 S.E. at 595. But see Lanitz v. Massie, 99 Va. 709, 40 S.E. 50
(1901).
13. 1 Scow, Tausvs § 57.1, at 445 (2d ed. 1956) ; SUGDN, Powtas 452 (8th ed.
1861).
14. "In the instant case Mrs. Dodd intended to create in those named to take the
property at her death a present vested interest save only as she might later decide to
divest it by revoking the trust. Her intention, as well as the favor which the law extends to conditions subsequent as against conditions precedent, makes necessary the
conclusion that the condition here was of the former class." Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 31, 147 Atl. 139, 142 (1929). See United Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946); Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Weinold, 12 Ill. App. 2d 209, 138 N.E. 2d 840 (1956) ; Goodrich v. City Natl Bank &
Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, 258 N.W. 253 (1935) ; Allen v. Hendrick, 104 Ore. 202, 206
Pac. 733 (1922). But cf. Alexander v. Zion's Say. Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317,
273 P.2d 173 (1954), aff'd on rehearing,4 Utah 2d 90, 287 P.2d 665 (1955).
15. 332 Mass. 535, 126 N.Ef2d 193 (1955).
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construed in accordance with the rules applicable to the construction of
wills. In view of the right reserved by the donor to revoke .

.

. it seems

clear that he did not intend the remainder interests to vest before his
death." 16 As to whether the remainder had vested at the settlor's or the
widow's death, the court said "It is settled that the early vesting of remainders is to be preferred ....

the testator."'

7

The remainders vested upon the death of

8
In Randall v. Bank of Am., the settlor owned a building and loan
association investment certificate over which he held a power of revocation
and substitution, with a remainder to his nephew. The nephew predeceased
him but the court thought that the testator intended to create an inter
vivos, rather than a testamentary, trust and indicated that the interests
vested upon creation. The same result was reached in First Nat'l Bank v.
Tenney, 19 where the settlor reserved to herself a life estate with a power to
revoke, alter, amend or terminate, and the remainder was given to her
sister. The sister predeceased the settlor. The parties conceded that the

trust was inter vivos and the court held that the remainder had vested.

Where the power to revoke is contained in an insurance trust, the remainder interest would appear to be similar to the remainder in an or20
dinary inter vivos trust. In Conway Trust, the settlor created an unfunded life insurance trust, reserving to himself the benefits for his life
and the power to amend or revoke. The remainder, after other life estates,
was to go to the issue of his daughters. Thereafter, the Uniform Principal
and Income Act was adopted in Pennsylvania 4 which, if applicable, would
provide a different apportionment of the increase of the corpus. It is settled in Pennsylvania that the act cannot be applied retroactively to pre-

viously created vested interests. The court held the statute applicable since
22
Dictum from other jurisdictions
the beneficiaries took only expectancies.
23
seems to indicate that this is the majority view. The courts say that the
16. Id. at 539, 126 N.E.2d at 195.
17. Ibid. Contra (as to whether the interest vested at the settlor's or the widow's
death), Bryant v. Hackett, 118 Conn. 233, 171 At. 664 (1934) (dictum). In this case,
the settlor created a trust, reserving a life estate to his wife for her life. Either might
modify or revoke the agreement. At the death of the survivor, the remainder was to
go to those entitled to the settlor's estate. The court said that the widow "might no
doubt so modify the agreement as to vest in her an immediate right to receive the
property.... The trust agreement before us created no vested rights [except for those
of the life tenant] . . . until the death of the survivor." Id. at 241, 171 Atl. at 667.
18. 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 119 P.2d 754 (1941).
19. 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956).
20. 7 Fiduciary Rep. 467 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1957).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3470.1-3470.13 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
22. Accord, Suelflow v. Supreme Lodge, Knights and Ladies of Honor, 165 Wis.
291, 162 N.W. 346 (1917).
23. E.g., Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38 (1953); Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E.2d 766 (1951) ; Contra, Continental Assurance Co. v.
Conroy, 209 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1954) (under New Jersey law interest of the beneficiaries said to be vested) ; Thomson v. Thomson, 156 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 793 (1946) (under Missouri law interest of the beneficiaries said to be contingent). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Sandstrand, 78 R.I. 457, 82 A.2d 863 (1951)
(beneficiary acquires no such vested interest as would deprive insured of the right to
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settlor-insured has reserved so much control in himself that the gift to the
beneficiary is a mere expectancy. This control, however, is not held to be
so substantial as to render the trust itself testamentary.2 Moreover, it is
not apparent that the insured has any more control than the courts permit
the settlor of an inter vivos trust to retain. The insured has the power to
redeem the policy or change the beneficiary, but this is no more than a
power to revoke or alter and amend, and the insured has no other control
over the corpus. While other considerations may justify treating an inter
vivos trust differently for other purposes, there would seem to be no real
distinction between an inter vivos trust and an unfunded life insurance trust
which would justify treating the remainder interests differently.
If for the moment the problem of whether or not the trust should be
construed as testamentary is left aside and it is assumed instead that the
trust is inter vivos, a decision as to whether or not an interest in default of
the exercise of a power of revocation is vested or contingent would not
seem to be difficult. This interest has the same characteristics as an interest in default of appointment. In either case, some person is given the
power to change in some respect-if not extinguish-the interest in default. While the holder of a power of revocation ordinarily has more control than the donee of a power, both as to the extent of the change and
the time at which it can occur, this control is no greater than that possessed by the donee of a general power of appointment exercisable by deed or
will. An interest in default of this broad power is held vested to the same5
extent as an interest in default of any more limited power of appointment.2
Regardless of what limits are placed on the power, its basic nature remains unchanged in that its exercise by the donee ordinarily changes the
course of devolution. 26 Although the Restatement distinguishes between
change the beneficiary). See also Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271

P.2d 653 (1954).
Where there is a tentative trust, courts have come to about the same conclusions.
The remainderman is held not to have a vested remainder and his interest can be destroyed by subsequent legislative action. Iafolla Estate, 380 Pa. 391, 110 A.2d 380
(1955) (dictum); It re Graham's Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 218 (Pa. Orphans' Ct.
1954). The trust is revocable and failure of the remainderman to survive the depositor is usually held to revoke. Matter of Ungara, 183 Misc. 907, 51 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Surr.
Ct. 1944) ; Matter of'Vaughan, 145 Misc. 332, 260 N.Y. Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
24. E.g., Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 353 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d 624 (1944);
Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954). But see Bickers
v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955).
25. E.g., Lantz v. Massie, 99 Va. 709, 40 S.E. 50 (1901); Earl of Salisbury v.
Lamb, Amb. 383, 27 Eng. Rep. 256 (Ch. 1759).
26. The fact that exercise of either power changes the course of disposition distinguishes the remainders herein discussed from remainders in default of other types of
powers. Where the power is to encroach upon, consume, or dispose of the corpus, the
holder of the power cannot alter the course of disposition. Whatever corpus remains at his death must go to the persons designated by the testator (or settlor). Thus,
the holder of the power can never deprive them of their remainder interest. He can, of
course, render the remainder valueless by diminishing the corpus to zero. But only
where the power is to revoke, appoint, or alter and amend can the remainder be
extinguished. The power to alter and amend has produced little litigation but whatever
conclusion is reached as to the power to revoke should also apply there, since by
amending, the settlor may substitute a new remainderman which has the same effect
on the original remainderman as a revocation.
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powers of appointment and powers of revocation, because conventional usage does so,27 the remainders are apparently treated similarly.2
Therefore, if the courts have correctly held the remainder to be vested
where the power is to appoint, it would seem that a similar conclusion
must follow where the power is to revoke.
Why an interest in default of a power of appointment is held to be
vested is rarely made clear. No court would hold that the remainder is
indefeasibly vested while the power can still be exercised, though that
does not mean that it is contingent. A remainder can be indefeasibly vested
or vested subject to divestment and in either case all of the consequences
of vesting apply. The issue, then, is whether the remainder in default of appointment is vested subject to divestment or whether it is contingent. It
would seem to be contingent. A remainder is contingent "where the estate
in remainder is limited to take effect, either to a dubious and uncertain
person, or upon a dubious and uncertain event. . . ." 2 The event
contemplated is one which "may never happen.... It is not the uncertainty
of enjoyment in future, but the uncertainty of the right to that enjoyment, which marks the difference between a vested and contingent interest. .

. ."

30 Whether or not the interest here will ever vest in possession

depends on the exercise of the power, an uncertain event, one which may
never happen. The uncertainty necessarily lies in the right to enjoyment,
for even if the remainderman survives the donee and all other owners of
prior interests, exercise of the power may still deprive him of his remainder interest.31
Most courts, in holding the remainder vested, have been satisfied to
rely on a long string of citations. Following the "string" to the origin of
the rule, however, affords little help in arriving at a justification for it. In
Cunningham v. Moody,32 apparently the first case to hold the remainder
vested, the Chancellor (Hardwicke) had two precedents available--one by
Lord Coke, a century before, 33 and one of his own, eight years before, 34
both holding that the remainder was contingent. The former was not cited,
the latter the Chancellor said he did not remember, and he proceeded without
discussion to hold the remainder vested.
The Restatement has come to the same conclusion. Its explanation of
the difference between remainders which are contingent and those which
27. RzSTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318, comment i (1940).
28. RESTATMENT, PROPERTY § 157, comment p (1936).
29. 2 BLACKSTONX, COmmxNTARnZS *169.
30. 4 KnNT, CommzNTARZs *206.

31. Normally, the donee, by his exercise, can wholly divest the remainder, but this
is not true where the power is a special nonexclusive power to appoint. The remainder
can be divested even though the remainderman survives the holders of all prior interests since a donee, surviving to the time the remainderman would take possession, can
usually appoint by his will.
32. 1 Ves. Sr. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965 (Ch. 1748).
33. Leonard Lovies's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1043 (K.B. 1614).
34. Walpole v. Lord Conway, Barnard. 153, 27 Eng. Rep. 593 (Ch. 1740).
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are vested subject to divestment appears at section 157 (u) and (p). Comment u states that:
"When a limitation creates a remainder and it is not possible to
point to any person and to say such person would take, if all interests
including a prior right to a present interest should now end, this
remainder is subject to a condition precedent [Restatement terminology for a contingent remainder]. This uncertainty distinguishes this
type of remainder . . . from those vested subject to complete defea-

sance [Restatement terminology for a remainder vested subject to divestment].

..

"

The following is found in comment p:
"When a remainder is vested subject to complete defeasance it
is possible to point to a person and to say that such person would take,
if all interests including a prior right to a present interest should now
end.. . . But the person thus clearly identified has no certainty of retaining such present interest as he may acquire and commonly has no
certainty of ever acquiring any present interest in the affected thing.
" 35

Assuming that the remainder would be vested absent the power, the
remainderman is identified. In the case of a collateral power (i.e., exercisable by someone other than the life tenant) the life tenant could die and
there would still be a specified person or persons who would be able to
take possession. Similarly, in the case of a collateral power or a power in
gross (i. e., exercisable by the life tenant) the life tenant might renounce,
but one could again point to specified persons able to take possession. It
could then be said that no conditions on the interests of these persons remain, exercise of the power being merely a divesting factor.
But the mere identification of the remainderman cannot be the basis
for declaring the remainder in default vested. If no more than identification of the remainderman were required, what is to prevent any remainder
to an ascertained person from being vested? For example, if a testator left
his estate to "my wife for her life and then to our three children or the
35. RSTATMEINT, PROPERTY § 157 comments u and p (1936). See also Harvard
College v. Balch, 171 Ill. 275, 280, 49 N.E. 543, 544 (1898), where the court said "These
persons to whom the remainder was given were determined and in being, and had a present capacity of taking the estate in remainder at the death of John Hancock [the testator-donor], if the life estate in Franklin [the donee] had then terminated. There was no
uncertainty as to who should take the remainder, and it was not limited to dubious or
uncertain persons. So, also, the time when the remainder would come into possession
undess divested was one which must necessarily occur in the efflux of time. It is true
[B]ut it is well settled that such a power of appoint... there is a . . . power ....
ment does not prevent the vesting of an estate in default of an exercise of the power.
(Emphasis added.) Qouaere: When the court said "unless divested" was it true
."
that there was no uncertainty as to who should take the remainder, that it was not
limited to dubious or uncertain persons, that it was one which must necessarily occur
in the efflux of time?
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survivors," and the widow elected to take against the will, the three children would be specified persons who could immediately take possession of
the remaining estate. They would thus take a vested remainder, with failure to survive the widow acting simply as a divesting factor. However,
the Restatement declares this remainder to be contingent.3 6 Yet there is no
significant difference between the condition of survival and nonexercise
of the power. Both are conditions on the remainder, both are stated in the
creating instrument, and both are uncertain events which may or may not
occur. The Restatement, nevertheless, has chosen to declare a remainder
in default vested 37 while declaring some other conditional remainders to
ascertained persons contingent.3 8 The question remains why a remainder
in default is held vested.
It has been suggested that the only basis for holding the remainder
40
39
favoring vested remainders.
vested is adherence to the presumption
Two reasons for applying the presumption in this instance can be found in
the cases. The first is a desire to avoid the effects of the rule destroying
contingent remainders.4 1 The second reason is a supposed enforcement of
36. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 250 (1940). A majority of courts have agreed with
the Restatement; see, e.g., Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill.
598, 50 N.E.2d 720 (1943) ; In re
Pleasonton, 45 .N.J. Super. 154, 131 A.2d 795 (App. Div. 1957); 1 SIMnS & SMITrH,
FUTURE INTEMSTS § 153 (2d ed. 1956).
37. The position adopted by the Restatement comes from the analysis of Fearne.
Fearne's position was that "In the . . .case [of contingent remainders], there exists
an actual limitation of the fee [i.e., a condition on the remainder in fee simple] ...
from the time of executing the deed; in the other [vested remainders subject to divestment], no limitation [i.e., condition] . . .actually exists, until the appointment gives it
essence.... Wherever the effect of the limitation is referred to a power of appointment, it is wholly ineffective from the execution of the deed, till that of the appointment; and as much of a nullity, until raised by the execution of the power, as if it had
never been noticed in the deed at all; but where it [i.e., the limitation] is finally made
by the original deed itself . . .nothing remains to give the deed any further operation
in respect to it."

FEARlIrg, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS

*232. Followed in

SUGDEN,

POWERS

452. (8th ed. 1861). If a remainderman can be identified in the event all prior interests
should immediately end, the Restatement would say that the remainder is vested.
Fearne is saying that a remainder in default of appointment is an interest without any
limitations, exercise of the power being merely divesting in nature and not placing any
limitation on the remainder until it occurs. However, as is pointed out in text both
nonsurvival and exercise of the power are conditions on the remainder; both are
stated in the creating instrument as conditions and both are uncertain events which
may or may not occur in the future. Applying the analysis also used in text, one could
say with as much justification as Fearne that a remainder to specified persons with a
condition of survivorship is without limitation, death before the life tenant being
only divesting in nature. In spite of the fact that any court relying on Fearne's analysis
still must make a choice between vesting and non-vesting, this analysis has proved to
be quite fashionable. See, e.g., Myers v. Adler, 6 Mackay 515, 521 (D.C. 1888)
(dictum) ; Crackanthorpe v. Sickles, 156 App. Div. 753, 141 N.Y. Supp. 370, 371 (1st
Dep't 1913).
38. E.g., RISTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 157, illustration 25 (1936); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 278, illustration 2 (1940).
39. The word presumption is used because the testator can make the remainder
contingent by express provision. Aside from this possibility, application of the presumption will result in holding the remainder vested.
40. Simes in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.35 (Casner ed. 1952). See Harvard College v. Balch, 171 Ill. 275, 49 N.E. 543 (1898); Hamner v. Edmonds, 327
Mo. 281, 36 S.W.2d 929 (1931).
41. Doe dem. Willis v. Martin, 4 T.R. 39, 70, 100 Eng. Rep. 882, 899 (K.B. 1790).
In Lantz v. Massie, 99 Va. 709, 713, 40 S.E. 50, 51 (1901), the court said "The law
does not favor the abeyance of estates, and never allows it to arise by construction or
implication."

1958]

REMAINDERS OVER IN DEFAULT

the intentions of the parties. At early common law, a contingent remainder could not be alienated,42 and, if the remainderman did not survive
the life tenant, the gift failed, passing to the surviving remaindermen if a
class gift, and if not such, passing to the testator's heirs or next of kin. If
the interest were held vested, when the remainderman predeceased the life
tenant the gift was preserved for the remainderman's estate-a result, so
the courts thought, more in accord with the testator's wishes. They conse43
quently presumed-and held-the remainder vested.
Neither reason, though, would appear to be valid today. In most
states, the rule destroying contingent remainders has been abolished.4 In
all jurisdictions, contingent remainders in real or personal property may
now freely pass by will or intestacy unless the remainder expressly or impliedly requires survival or is to a class as yet unascertained. 5 Neither of
these exceptions is present if the interest in default of the power would be
vested absent the power. The fact that the same result will usually follow
whether the remainder is construed to be vested or contingent accounts
for the small number of jurisdictions which have passed upon the issue
in recent years 46 In recent cases involving the power to revoke, however,
the problem is again presented. The identity, in effect, of the two powers 47
has led 4 and probably will continue to lead to application of the same
presumption where the power is to revoke.
42. King v. Withers, Talbot 117, 25 Eng. Rep. 692, 696-97 (1735).
43. "In the will ... there is no language which we think indicative of an intent
on his part that only such of his named children as should survive their mother should
take under his will. . . . No provision is made for the children of any child who might
die leaving children prior to the widow's death. It can hardly be supposed that Mr.
Hamner [the testator-donor] intended to provide that the property should go, at the
widow's death if she made no will, to those only of his children who survived their
mother....
There is nothing in the will inconsistent with the conclusion that Mr.
Haimner intended the remainder to vest in his named children at his death, subject to
the widow's power of appointment." Hamner v. Edmonds, 327 Mo. 281, 294, 36 S.W.2d
929, 934 (1931). See Doe dem. Willis v. Martin, 4 T.R. 39, 70, 100 Eng. Rep. 882, 899
(K.B. 1790).
44. 1 SiAMs & SMITH, FUTURE INTR STS §§ 207, 209 (2d ed. 1956), list thirtyone jurisdictions which have abolished the destructibility rule, twenty-six by statute
and five by judicial action. Seven are listed as upholding it. In Florida and Oregon the
decisions supporting the rule are recent. The Pennsylvania and Tennessee cases upholding it are old, but not overruled. If presented with the issue today, these latter states
might follow the five states which have abolished the rule by court decision. In Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas, only dictum supports the rule. In England the rule
has been abolished by statute. Ibid.
45. 4 SI Es & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 44, §§ 1883, 1886, 1902.
46. And even where the problem is discussed, courts are apathetic as to the result.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A2d 819, 827 (Del. 1957) '("It is true that both of
these remainder interests-whether vested or contingent makes no difference-were subject to defeasance by the exercise of the reserved power of appointment.") But see
Matter of Bishop's Estate, 206 Misc. 7, 129 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Surr. Ct. 1954), af'd, 1
App. Div. 2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 294, 144 N.E.2d
63 (1957) where the decision was important. The gift over in default of appointment
was to a Scottish hospital. After testatrix's death the hospital was nationalized. If
the court had held that the remainder was contingent, it would have lapsed.
47. See text at notes 13-19 supra.
48. First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956).
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In a case involving a power to revoke, a court must be particularly
cautious in applying this presumption, since, in so doing, it might determine that a remainder was vested and then assume, without consideration, that the trust created was inter vivos rather than testamentary. For
example, a settlor might create a trust reserving to himself a life interest
and a power to revoke, but in default of revocation his two sons to take.
Assuming that the settlor also retains additional control over the trust
property (e.g., power to control investments), the issue is raised whether
the settlor has actually parted with ownership during his life. If he has not,
the trust is testamentary and the interests of the sons are expectancies
rather than remainders. A court focusing on the presumption in favor of
vesting might find vested remainders without determining that the remainders existed, i.e., that control was not so great as to make the trust
4
testamentary. 9
Although the presumption has its basis solely in history, it has proved
to be a convenient tool in deciding cases. And its almost universal acceptance as a rule of law provides certainty. However, it must be remembered
that the effect of holding a remainder vested or contingent will often result
in property of the testator or settlor passing to one litigant rather than
another. When there is no supervening rule of law or dictate of policy, the
role of a court should be to carry out the intention of the testator or settlor.
If no intention is evident, a court could well rely on the historical
presumption to decide a borderline case. However, the presumption should
not be used as a rule of law making all remainders in default vested. Intention can and should override it.50
WHERE THE REMAINDER WoULD BE CONTINGENT ABSENT THE POWER

Where the remainder would be contingent absent the power, no difficulties are created by its being contingent if the remainder will vest

at or before the last moment that the power can be exercised. Thus,
where the testator (or settlor) creates a life estate in his wife with power
of appointment, and in default of appointment, remainders to the surviving children, 51 or "to be divided among" or "to go to" their children,52 or
to the heirs of the settlor or donee,5 3 the remainders are all contingent at
49. See Alexander v. Zion's Say. Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317, 273 P.2d 173
(1954), aff'd on rehearing,4 Utah 2d 90, 287 P.2d 665 (1955).
50. One can well doubt whether the courts in Matter of Bishop's Estate, 206 Misc.
7, 129 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Surr. Ct. 1954), af'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st
Dep't 1956), af'd, 3 N.Y.2d 294, 144 N.E.2d 63 (1957), in holding the remainder
vested, were carrying out the testatrix's intentions. Testatrix bequeathed property to
a hospital whose deficit it would seem would have had to be made up to some extent
from charitable contributions. With nationalization, the government will make up
any deficit. Knowing these facts would testatrix have made the same disposition?
Defending the result reached by the court, see Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 163 (1954).
51. E.g., Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788 (1898) ; Peabody v. Tyszkiewicz, 191 Mass. 317, 77 N.E. 839 (1906); Geneva Trust Co. v. Sill, 27 N.Y.S.2d 289
(Surr. Ct. 1941).
52. In re Gray's Estate, 89 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Surr. Ct. 1949). But see Lantz v. Massie, 99 Va. 709, 40 S.E. 50 (1901).
53. A gift to the heirs of the settlor or donee in default of appointment raises the
problem whether a remainder of any type has been created. The common-law doctrine
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the creation of the power but must vest at the death of the donee. The result is the same where the power is to revoke in either an inter vivos s or
life insurance 55 trust. However, where the remainder can remain contingent after the donee's death, serious problems as to the application of the
Rule Against Perpetuities may be present.
In the application of the Rule to powers, a distinction is made according to the scope of the power involved. The purpose of the Rule is to make
property freely alienable. Therefore, if interests are created which give to
one person a freedom of disposition of the property, the Rule should not run
during the period when he has this ability.56 Where the power is a general
power of appointment exercisable by deed or will, the donee has this ability
since he can at any time appoint to himself or anyone else. Accordingly,
where the issue has arisen while this general power was still exercisable, the
courts have held that the period of the Rule was not running.57 Where the
issue has arisen after such a power has been exercised, courts have held that
the period was not running prior to the exercise.58 But, where the donee has
of worthier title provides that where a settlor (or testator) creates a life estate with
a remainder to his heirs, the heirs take by descent and not by purchase. The interest
created therefore would seem to be a reversion in the settlor and not a remainder to
the heirs. At the time the doctrine of worthier title was held to be a rule of property,
this probably was true. Today, however, the doctrine is a rule of construction. R sTAT4MENT, PROPERTY § 314 (1940); REsTATzmzNT, TRuSTS § 127 (1935). In this modern

context courts have reached varying results; holding the interest in default to be a remainder vesting at the death of the settlor, see Briggs v. Briggs, 122 Cal. App. 2d 766,
265 P.2d 587 (1954) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E2d 113
(1944) ; Matter of Burchell, 299 N.Y. 351, 87 N.E.2d 293 (1949) ; holding the interest
in default to be a reversion, see Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Parfner, 135 N.J. Eq. 133,
37 A.2d 675 (Ch. 1944); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278 N.Y. 134, 15
N.E.2d 553 (1938); Dunnett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d
281 (1938). The courts have usually said that they are making ad hoc determinations,
but some of the decisions are difficult to distinguish.
54. Bryant v. Hackett, 118 Conn. 233, 171 At1. 664 (1934) (to the settlor's estate);
MacMillan v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 221 N.C. 352, 20 S.E.2d 276 (1942) (to
surviving children) ; Atchison v. Dieterich, 315 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1957) (to the settlor's
heirs). The latter two cases present one problem where the remainders are contingent:
Settlor, without reserving a power of revocation, creates a trust with contingent in-

terests in remainder. Thereafter, a statute is passed making all trusts revocable unless
the trust instrument expressly provides otherwise. Can the settlor now revoke? The
two cases here cited held that he could. Where the interest in default is vested, it has
been held that the remainder could not be destroyed. Succession of Forstner, 186 La.
577, 173 So. 111 (1937). But a statute of this type apparently will apply to a remainder
vested subject to divestment. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Wellslager, 88 Cal. App. 2d
210, 198 P.2d 700 (1948). As to the application of a state estate tax on property passing in default, enacted subsequent to the creation of the trust, see Coolidge v. Long,
282 U.S. 582 (1931) (vested remainder) ; Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936) (contingent remainder) ; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260 (1928) (vested remainder
subject to divestment).
55. E.g., McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N.E.2d 250 (1938); Taylor v.
Sanderson, 330 Mass. 616, 116 N.E.2d 269 (1953) (both cases involving express conditions precedent of survival and the effect of such a requirement on a common disaster).
56. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PaRPEUITM~S § 524.1 (4th ed. 1942) approves of . .
the simple . . . doctrine that an interest [the remainder], which is presently destruc-

tible is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities!' See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 373 (1944).
57. Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896); Schellentrager v.
Tradesmens Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 370 Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952). See RsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 373 (1944).
58. Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 AtI. 525 (1888) ; Bray v. Bree, 2 Cl. & Fin.
453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (H.L. 1834). Contra, Freme v. Clement, 18 Ch.D. 499 (1881).
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died without exercising the power, courts have not uniformly followed the
free alienability rationale.
In Ortman v. Dugan,59 the testator left property to his son for life,
then to the son's issue for their lives. After each grandchild of the testator
reached twenty-one, he had the power to appoint his share by deed or will.
In default of appointment, the property was to pass to the testator's
daughter. Testator's son had no children who survived the testator, so that
alienability was not restricted more than twenty-one years after the life
of the son, but the court held the remainder to the daughter void. Whatever the result where a general power of appointment is exercisable by
deed or will, the same result should follow where the power is an unlimited
power to revoke a trust since the settlor can revoke at any time and then
dispose of the property at his pleasure. As in the case of a general power to
appoint by deed or will, alienability is in no way restricted. There is reasoning contrary to the Ortman decision in the cases where unlimited
powers to revoke trusts were not exercised. In cases involving inter vivos
trusts, courts have held the remainder valid on the ground that the settlor
could have revoked the trust whenever he desired. 60 And in Manufacturers
Life Ins. Co. v. von Hamn-Young Corp.,61 where the settlor set up an unfunded life insurance trust, reserving to himself a life estate in the benefits
and a power to revoke with a remainder to his children at the age of
twenty-five, the court held the remainder good for the same reason. So
long as, within the period of the Rule, there is someone in whose hands
the property is freely alienable-and in all of these cases there was-there
would appear to be no justification for reaching any other result.
The greatest difficulty arises where the power is a general testamentary or special power of appointment or a power of revocation with limitations on the modifications that can be made. The first difficulty arises in
ascertaining the point from which the period of the Rule is to be computed
for determining the validity of either the remainders or the interests
created by the exercise of the power. If a power of appointment is special,
the courts agree that the Rule is computed from the creation of the power
(i.e., death of the donor or creation of the trust).62 Where the power is a
general testamentary power, the majority of jurisdictions have held that
63
the Rule should again be computed from the creation of the power.
59. 130 Md. 121, 100 Atl. 82 (1917).
60. Schenectady Trust Co. v. Emmons, 261 App. Div. 154, 25 N.Y.S.2d 230 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 286 .N.Y. 626, 36 N.E.2d 461 (1941); Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117
Misc. 708, 193 N.Y. Supp. 152 (Surr. Ct. 1922), aff'd ner., 206 App. Div. 689, 199
N.Y. Supp. 921 (1st Dep't 1923).

61. 34 Hawaii 288, 86 U. PA. L. R.v. 221, 51 Hagv. L. REv. 172 (1937).
62. E.g., Brown v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co., 123 Ky. 775, 97 S.W. 421
(1906); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); lit re Churston
Settled Estates [1954] Ch. 334.
63. E.g., Mondell v. Thom, 143 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Variell, 143 Conn. 524, 123 A.2d 874 (1956) ; American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228
N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948); Cleveland Trust Co. v. McQuade, 142 N.E.2d 249
(Ohio App. 1957). Contra, Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927);

Rous v. Jackson, 29 Ch.D. 521 (1885).
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Whether the power be special or a general testamentary power, courts
that compute the Rule from the creation of the power have the additional
problem of deciding whether to evaluate the interests created by actualities
or potentialities. Most of these courts have chosen the former test. They
reason that the donor has left the donee with a choice to be made in the
light of circumstances existing at the time he exercises the power and the
Rule should be computed in the light of those circumstances. Therefore,
when determining the validity of interests created by the donee's exercise
of a power, these courts take a "second look" and if the interests created
will in fact vest within the period of perpetuities, as measured from the
creation of the power, the appointment is valid.64
Should such a doctrine be applied where the donee (or settlor) fails
to exercise the power and the property passes in default? In Sears v.
Coolidge, 65 the settlor reserved to himself the power to change or alter
any of the trusts and declare new uses "except such as will vest in myself the trust property or any beneficial interest therein." The court construed this to be a special power of appointment. The corpus of the trust
was to be distributed to the settlor's issue when the youngest surviving
grandchild of the settlor attained the age of fifty. Testing by potentialities
would require the court to hold the remainder void because the youngest
surviving grandchild to reach the age of fifty might not have been alive at
the creation of the trust. Since this did not actually occur, taking a "second
look" at the last possible moment when the donee could have exercised the
power, i.e., at his death, would save the remainder. The court held the remainder valid, analogizing nonexercise to exercise of the power for purposes of testing the validity of the remainder. By failing to exercise the
power, the settlor made as much of a choice among the persons who could
possibly take as he would have made had he exercised the power. 66 Not
until his death could it be learned whether the remainder would ever take
effect and at that point the remainder was valid. In Olmsted Estate,67 the
settlor reserved to himself a life estate and a testamentary power "to
change the proportions and interests the beneficiaries, other than himself,
shall respectively take. . .

."

At his death, each of his three 68 children was

to receive income from a portion of the corpus and as each died, his portion would go to his children. All of the settlor's children were born before
the creation of the trust, but the court held the remainder bad.6 9 In In re
64. E.g., Rutherford v. Farrar, 118 S.W2d 79 (Mo. App. 1938); Marx v. Rice,
3 N.J. Super. 581, 67 A.2d 918 (Ch. 1949); Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 Atl,

396 (1936).

65. 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952).
66. Had he exercised the power in favor of his issue and the issue had elected to
take by the exercise, their interest would have been valid.
67. 65 Pa. D. & C. 451 (Orphans' Ct. 1947).
68. The settlor named the children who were to take, but a subsequent clause would
have permitted afterborn children to take.
69. But see Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950). Since the settlor
canalized the shares of his estate, the court reached an incorrect result in holding the
remainder bad even without taking a "second look."
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Frost,70 testator devised land to his unmarried daughter, then to her hus-

band (who might not yet have been born), then to her children as she
should appoint, and in default of appointment, to the children surviving
both daughter and husband, and, in default of issue, to testator's other
children. Two years after the testator's death, daughter married and in the
same year died without issue. Eighteen years after testator's death, the
husband died. The court held, alternatively, 71 that the remainder to the
testator's other children violated the Rule. Apparently, applicability of the
"second look" doctrine was not considered in either of these cases.
If courts elect to take a "second look" when the donee exercises the
power, there seems no reason why they should consider potentialities
rather than actualities when he fails to exercise the power. The fact that
the donor (or settlor), has designated the persons who will take in default
should not require a different result even though the remainder relates
back to the instrument which created the power and is thus analogous to
those remainders which are necessarily evaluated at creation, i.e., those not
subject to a power. The persons to whom the donee may appoint can be
designated with as much specificity as persons taking by default, as, for
example, where the remainder is to the donee's children in such shares
as the donee appoints and in default of appointment to the children
equally, and in such a case courts will nevertheless take a "second look" if
the power is exercised. 72 Furthermore, regardless of whether the persons
taking by default are specified, the uncertainty of their taking possession
is as great as for any possible appointees since the donee has the choice of
exercising or not exercising the power. Thus, it is not the donor who is
deciding who will necessarily take. This being so, any distinction between
exercise and nonexercise would appear unwarranted.
The "second look" approach is needed for special powers and general
testamentary powers, only because the Rule is computed in most American
jurisdictions from the creation of the power. In the case of a general testamentary power, the courts have so held because the property is totally removed.from commerce during the donee's life.73 In the case of a special
70. 43 Ch.D. 246 (1889).
71. The court held alternatively that, since the husband might not have been born
at the creation of power, the interest was void as a double possibility or possibility on

a possibility, that is, a gift to an unborn person for life and then to his issue. At common law, such a gift was bad per se. On this point, if In re Frost had not been overruled by the English case law, see In re Garnham [ 1916] 2 Ch. 413, it was by statute.
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Gpo. 5, c. 20, § 161. The issue has never been decided in
this country.
72. See RnSTATsMnNT, PROPERTY § 392 (1944).
73. This generally is the view advanced by John Chipman Gray; see Gray, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 26 HAzv. L. Riv. 720
(1913). Taking issue with this position was Kales in Genwral Powers and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 26 HARv. L. Rzv. 64 (1912). Kales started with the proposition
that during the time when the donee cannot appoint to himself, he is not, practically
speaking, the owner and therefore the running of the Rule cannot be suspended. However, while this is so during the donee's life, it is not so at the moment he exercises
the power. At his death the donee can do anything with respect to the property that
he could do if he were the owner. For this reason, the Rule should be computed from
the exercise of the power. Although Kales has been supported by some of the text-
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power, it is removed to the extent of the limitation on the donee's freedom
of choice in the exercise of his power. Because the purpose of the Rule is
to strike down restraints on free alienability lasting longer than a prescribed period, any interest constituting such a restraint should "run" the
period. Whether such a restraint does exist before the power is exercised
remains to be seen.
In the case of a general testamentary power, the donee may not appoint during his life, but if he contracts to appoint to a specified person
in his will, this appointment will not be invalidated by the fact that it was
made in accordance with the prior contract.7 4 While the contract is not
specifically enforceable, 75 it seems to be conceded that the disappointed
party can get restitution if the donee fails to appoint as he contracted.76
If the donee conveys his life estate in the property and can contract to appoint the future interest, he has in effect conveyed as much as he could
have, had the power been exercisable by deed.7 7 For purposes of satisfying the Rule, free alienability is achieved since, practically speaking, the
remainder is presently destructible.78 It may be argued that the donee is not
likely to "put his will on the market."7 9 Why the donee would be less
likely to make a contract than execute a deed is not apparent, but even if
he is, this would seem to be immaterial since he has the power to do so if
he wishes.80
writers, see, e.g., Gold, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 58 L.Q. REv. 400 (1942); Thorndike, General Powers and Perpetuities, 27
HA v. L. RFv. 705 (1914), Gray's position has been accepted by most American courts.
For textwriters reaching the same conclusion as Gray, see MoRRIs & LACH, RULE

AGAINST PZRPErUrrxs 138-40 (1956).
74. See 5 AMEIcAu
LAv ov PROP RTY § 23.35, at 550 (Casner ed. 1952). The
case law would appear to disagree with the Restatement on this point. See RnSTATZmENT, PROPaTY § 340 (1940).
75. In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N.Y. 290, 114 N.E. 389 (1916),
the court refused to give specific performance, saying, "up to the last moment of his
life he was to have the power to deal with the share as he thought best. . . . To permit him to bargain that right away would be to defeat the purpose of the donor." Id. at
293-94, 114 N.E. at 390.
76. 3 PowzLL, RxAL PROPERTY § 395 (1952) ; 2 Sizs & SMITH, FUTURE INTEMSTS
§ 1015 (2d ed. 1956). Some courts have held that an action for damages lies when the
donee fails to appoint as he has contracted. See cases collected in 5 AMwuCAN LAw oi
PROPERTY § 23.35, at 549 (Casner ed. 1952).
77. The proposition that the Rule must run if the donee cannot appoint to himself
does not seem to be controlling. If the donee can freely dispose of his life interest and
the remainder during his life, then it would seem to be immaterial that he cannot appoint to himself and then dispose of the property. The fact that he cannot appoint to
himself will not vest in him all of the indicia of title, but an unlimited power of dis-

position is the only factor crucial when considering the Rule, and the donee does have
this.
78. See note 56 supra.
79. Cf. 3 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTUESTS § 1275 (2d ed. 1956).
80. This analysis probably should not be applicable if (and as long as) the donee
is unborn. But in Bray v. Bree, 2 CI. & Fin. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (H.L. 1834), where
there was a general power exercisable by deed or will, the fact that the donees were
unborn did not affect the result. If the power is collateral, the donee cannot convey the
life estate. Even assuming that in such a case the Rule must be computed from the
creation of the power since the donee of a collateral power cannot alone dispose of
the entire interest in the property, this problem should not often arise; collateral powers
of appointment and revocation are both uncommon.
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Where the power is special, it is said that the Rule must be*computed
from the creation of the power because the donee's power of disposition
is limited. Normally this is so, but a power permitting the donee to appoint
to anyone other than himself has also been held special for purposes of the
Rule, 8 1 as in Sears v. Coolidge, and in this case the donee can freely dis
pose of the property, whether in a conveyance for value, in satisfaction of
his debts, or gratuitously. -Je may deal with the property in almost every
practical sense as though it were his own, 82 as may the donee of a general
testamentary power. Therefore, it would seem that the Rule should be
computed from the exercise of the power where it is a general testamentary
power and also, although no court has so held, where the power is special
but the donee may appoint to anyone other than himself.
Where the donor designates the possible appointees, the Rule must be
computed from the creation of the power but since the donee can choose
among such persons and does so by appointing or failing to appoint,83 the
"second look" doctrine should be employed. However, where the objects
of the power and the persons taking by default are the same and the power
is nonexclusive, the donor has selected the persons who must take, the
donee merely fixing their respective portions. Since the donee's power to
choose is so limited, the "second look" should not be taken in this limited
situation.84

If a power is not exercised and the remainder should fail for violating
the Rule, or for any other reason, a question of devalution of title arises.
It has been held that a special power is not to be construed as in trust and
therefore no gift is to be implied to the objects of the power. 85 If the power
is general and the donee has taken some action with respect to it, five
jurisdictions will permit the property to pass to his estate through a doctrine of capture or resulting trust.8 6 Other jurisdictions come to about the
81. Such a power is not special for other purposes because the possible appointees
form a group which is too large.
82. A contrary position is taken in Moais & LZcAH, RuLE AGAINST P~MPTuI-

Tizs 129 (1956). But see note 77 supra.
83. See text at notes 65, 66, 72 supra.
84. This problem should not often arise since there is a presumption that the donor
intended an exclusive power. The donor must clearly express a contrary intention before the power will be held nonexclusive. See cases cited in 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTrY
§ 398 (1952) ; see 5 AmgRucAN LAW or PROPERTY § 23.57 (Casner ed. 1952). The Restatenent has adopted a similar position. RESTATEMENT, PRoPEmTY § 360 (1940).
85. Re Sprague, 43 L.T.R. 236 (V.C. 1880). If a special power is not exercised
and there is no gift over in default of appointment, courts hold the power in trust, i.e.,
divide the gift equally among the objects of the power when it is apparent that the
testator or settlor so intended. E.g., Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931);
Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. Jr. 561, 32 Eng. Rep. 473 (Ch. 1803).
86. When the donee of a general power makes an appointment (other than in
trust) that fails but manifests an intention not only to appoint but also to withdraw
the property for all purposes from the course of devolution established by the instrument creating the power, the property will be held, under the doctrine of capture, to be
part of the donee's estate. Absent a provision to the contrary, the property will similarly be held to revert back to the estate of the donee as a resulting trust when a
donee of a general power has appointed in trust but the appointment fails. These
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same conclusion through the analogous doctrine of blending.87 In some
jurisdictions the likelihood of a failure to exercise the general power is
minimized by statutes providing that the power is automatically exercised
if the donee's will purports to dispose of all his property, unless donor or
donee expressly provide otherwise. 88 If the property does not devolve by
any of the above means and neither the donor nor donee has made other
provision in case of failure, apparently the property will revert back to the
donor's estate and pass by his residuary clause; but if the power has been
created in the residuary clause and the remainder fails, e.g., for violation
of the Rule, the property should pass to the donor's heirs or next of kin.
This is the disposition which is made when the appointment fails, the
theories are so similar that courts have not always distinguished between the two terminologies. It was held that the donee manifested intent such as to effect a capture in,
e.g., Bradford v. Andrew, 308 Ill. 458, 139 N.E. 922 (1923) (donee expressly provided
in her residuary clause that the clause was to dispose of both the appointive and her
own property) ; It re Marten [1902] 1 Ch. 314 (C.A. 1900) (donee devised, bequeathed,
and appointed the residue of her property). It was held that an appointment in trust
failed and the property passed by resulting trust to the donee's estate in, e.g., Amerige
v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949) ; Marx v. Rice, 3 N.J. Super.
581, 67 A.2d 918 (CI. 1949) (alternative holding). But see Northern Trust Co. v.
Porter, 368 Il. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938) (donee must manifest an intent that
property revert back to his estate). See RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 426 (1935).
These doctrines apply whether or not there is a gift over in default. Fiduciary Trust
Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 .N.E.2d 3 (1947). Once property is held part of the
donee's estate, it is apparently a part of his estate for all purposes, including liability
for the payment of the donee's debts, taxes, and funeral expenses. In re Hadley [1909]
1 Ch. 20, 35 (C.A. 1908) (opinion of Farwell, L.J.); I. re Vander Byl [1931] 1 Ch.
216, 223 (1930) (dictum). When such property becomes part of the donee's estate it
ordinarily passes by his residuary clause, but if the appointment was contained in the
residuary clause, the property passes to the donee's heirs or next of kin. Talbot v. Riggs,
287 Mass. 144, 191 N.E. 360 (1934) (appointment failed for violation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities) ; itz re Marten [1902] 1 Ch. 314 (C.A. 1900) (appointment failed
because of lapse) ; It re Hawksley's Settlement [1934] 1 Ch. 384 (1933) (appointment failed because appointed trust was invalid). See excellent Comment, General
Powers of Appointmet-Ieffective .Appointmets-Devolution of Appointed Estates,
22 So. CAipa. L. Rzv. 270 (1949).
87. Under the doctrine of blending, the donee of a general power may exercise the
power in such a way as to amount to an appointment of the property to his own estate.
Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A2d 360 (1940). Where the donee passes both the
appointive and his own property by his residuary clause the property has been held to
have been blended. Reed v. Mcllvain, 113 Md. 140, 77 Atl. 329 (1910). Where, however, the donee directs payment of his debts and funeral expenses and then disposes of
both estates by his residuary clause, the property apparently has not been blended.
lohnson v. Shriver, 121 Colo. 397, 216 P2d 653 (1950); Anderson Estate, 373 Pa.
294, 95 A.2d 674 (1953) ; Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A.2d 360 (1940). But see
Barclay v. United States, 175 F.2d 48 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 849 (1949)
(applying Pennsylvania law). Nor was the property held blended where, in addition to
directing payment of his debts and then passing both estates by his residuary clause,
the donee provided that in the event his estate was not sufficient to pay taxes and bequests, the bequests were to be reduced proportionately. Shriners Hospital v. Citizens
Bank, 198 Va. 130, 92 S.E.2d 503 (1956). Where the appointive property has been
blended, it is subject to the donee's debts and taxes equally with his own property.
Blending, however, will not make the property available to the donee's spouse who
elects to take against the will. Kates's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 AtI. 97 (1925). The
doctrine of blending appears to have been rejected in Connecticut. McMurtry v. State,
111 Conn. 594, 151 Atl. 252 (1930).
88. E.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 502.71 (1945); N.Y. RZt. PROP. LAw § 176; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14 (14) (Purdon 1950); VA. COD ANN. § 64-67 (1950).
Eighteen states have such statutes.
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power is not found to be in trust, and there is no gift over in default.8 9 If
the remainder fails only in part, apparently the part not destroyed will
pass as the donor intended. 90
J.A.P.
89. See, e.g., Freme v. Clement, 18 Ch.D. 499 (1880); Wollastin v. King, L.R.
8 Eq. 164 (1868).
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788 (1898); In re Gray's
Estate, 89 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Surr. Ct. 1949). This problem arises in states where a surviving spouse iiay treat certain trust instruments as testamentary and claim a portion
of the corpus at the settlor's death. Here too, apparently, the remaining portion passes
as the settlor intended. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon 1950).

